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Australia’s so-called “New Administrative Law” reforms revolutionised citizen-government 
interaction in the 1970s and 1980s, with initiatives such as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman. Previous studies have focused on the political and policy 
foundations of these accountability systems, neglecting the subsequent role of politics in enabling 
these agencies to meet difficult service delivery challenges. This article investigates the decision of 
the Commonwealth and Queensland governments to create a shared ombudsman office in Brisbane 
in 1979, briefly noting changes to this agreement by 1981 under new Queensland Ombudsman 
leadership. Intergovernmental negotiations are examined as a case study in the importance of 
professional relationships to the wider success of the “New Administrative Law” agenda. It explores 
the problems that the newly created Commonwealth Ombudsman faced when delivering 
administrative justice within a federation of states. Despite disagreements between the parties in 
other policy areas, Queensland and the Commonwealth could cooperate, when encouraged by the 
goodwill of the ombudsmen themselves. Other factors aiding this process included: the federal 
government’s early vision for a Commonwealth Ombudsman with staff nationwide, the positive 
example set by Western Australia’s shared ombudsman facilities with the Commonwealth, and the 
need to plan for joint ombudsman investigations. 
 




 On 6 May 2009, the then Commonwealth ombudsman, Professor John McMillan,1 officially opened 
the new premises of the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Queensland branch office at Level 17, 53 
Albert Street, Brisbane. At the time of writing, this address is shared with several complaint-handling 
agencies, including the Queensland Ombudsman.2 As the head of an institution devoted to the 
impartial investigation of public complaints about federal government administration, including its 
improvement at a systemic level, McMillan emphasised the co-location benefits: 
 
The co-location of our new offices is a clear demonstration of the close and cooperative 
working relationship between complaint-handling agencies in Australia ... We strive to 
remove all barriers—real or perceived—to access to our services. Our new premises offer 
the practical advantage of a shared shopfront where people will be seamlessly referred to 
the agency best able to help them.3 
 
Co-location of the Queensland and Commonwealth Ombudsman offices has been ongoing since 11 
June 1979—initially at floor 21, Watkins Place, 288 Edward Street.4 This article focuses on the 
development of this office-sharing arrangement, exploring the factors that encouraged and hindered 
co-location, and uses the arrangement as a case study of cooperative service delivery and the 
professional relationships that helped to create powerful change in Australia’s public administration 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Broadly speaking, Administrative Law is “about challenging official 
power ... [and] defining the powers of the state, as well as protecting, or limiting, the rights and 
liberties of members of society, whether they be citizens, non-citizens, business entities or other 
non-government bodies.”5 “New Administrative Law” was the name given to a package of reforms 
that led to the creation of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the Freedom of Information Act, merits 
review and judicial review legislation.6 Courts have also played a significant role as interpreters of 
the law.7 The International Ombudsman Institute defines an ombudsman as an integrity agency that 
“deals with complaints from the public regarding decisions, actions or omissions of ... [public and 
private sector] administration ... The role of the ombudsman is to protect the people against 
violation of rights, abuse of powers, error, negligence, unfair decisions and maladministration.”8 It 
should be noted that “the suffix ‘man’ in Swedish, from which the title ombudsman originates, has 
no sexist connotation, but simply means ‘person’”.9 
 
Queensland was not the first state to arrange an ombudsman office-sharing agreement with the 
Commonwealth (Western Australia opened its joint shopfront in 1978),10 nor was it the last: 
agreements were subsequently implemented in the Northern Territory, South Australia and 
Tasmania.11 However, Queensland’s experience merits investigation as a glimpse into the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s formative years, offering an insight into the challenges Australia 
faced as the first country in the world to introduce a national ombudsman into a federation of 
states, in 1977—a model thus far only repeated in Belgium, in 1997.12 Federated nations such as the 
United States and Germany also have ombudsmen, but only at the state/provincial level.13 Another 
reason for exploring Queensland’s negotiations with the Commonwealth lie in Premier Johannes 
Bjelke-Petersen’s vocal criticism of the ombudsman concept, prior to the appointment of 
Queensland’s first state ombudsman, David Longland (see Figure 1), in August 1974.14 Bjelke-
Petersen’s often negative attitude towards the Commonwealth during the 1970s is also relevant—
particularly when Indigenous land rights and mining development intersected.15 Beyond these 
obstacles to co-location, factors that aided the creation of a joint ombudsman office in Queensland 
are also discussed, namely the positive reception the arrangement received in Western Australia and 
growing recognition of the prospect of joint ombudsman investigations—with the resulting need to 
manage such activities between the States and the Commonwealth. Reference is also made to 
concern for the public image of the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the politics of its office 
location in relation to other parts of the nation’s emerging administrative law system, specifically the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
 
Figure 1. Sir David Longland. Source: Queensland Ombudsman. 
 
This article hopes to partially redress “a general deficiency in the historical coverage of Australian 
administrative law”.16 The article proceeds with an overview of the literature on the early service 
delivery challenges of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, before canvassing the context behind the 
introduction of ombudsmen in Australia generally (at both state and national levels) and detailing 
their functions. The Commonwealth-Queensland case study will then follow. However, some 
terminology clarification is needed first. During the period under discussion, the Queensland 
Ombudsman was officially titled the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administrative Investigations, 
with its powers expressed in the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1974. Following a strategic review 
of the Office in 1998,17 the title “Ombudsman” was suggested to better align the Office with its more 
commonly recognisable name.18 Passage of the Ombudsman Act on 4 December 2001 brought this 
recommendation into effect.19 This term is used throughout the article for consistency with its 
Commonwealth equivalent. The essentially identical functions of the Parliamentary Commissioner 
and Ombudsman are acknowledged.20 These deliberations are evidence of the importance placed on 
the public visibility of the Queensland Ombudsman, an issue of common concern to its fledgling 




Much has been written on the political and policy foundations of the “New Administrative Law”, 
including the ombudsman’s place within it,21 but little attention is given to the service delivery 
dynamics and implementation politics of the Commonwealth Ombudsman—despite 
“communication with potential users of our services” being “a constant challenge”.22 Effective 
service delivery is also linked to an ombudsman’s credibility, as ombudsmen regularly respond to 
complaints of bureaucratic delay and must therefore be seen to be above reproach when issuing 
critical reports into the performance of government agencies.23 At the time, several authors 
pondered how these federal-state service delivery arrangements might be implemented in Australia 
and what it could mean for the nation’s handling of administrative complaints. 
 
In 1971, David Benjafield and Harry Whitmore conceded that “the appointment of individual 
Ombudsmen in each State may not be fully effective without Federal co-operation since human 
problems do not respect the nice boundaries of power”.24 In the 1960s, commentators viewed the 
prospect of a single Australian ombudsman as either impractical or more wisely instituted at the 
state level first.25 During the 1980s, Kenneth Wiltshire and Donald Rowat were enthusiastic about 
the shared office agreements between the Commonwealth, Queensland and Western Australia, 
arguing it was a promising step towards countering public ignorance as to which level of government 
had responsibility for a citizen’s particular grievance.26 Professor Jack Richardson (see Figure 2), 
foundation Commonwealth ombudsman (1977–85),27 saw these early ombudsman office-sharing 
arrangements as important for entrenching his office into the Australian accountability landscape–
singling out their establishment for mention in a 1995 interview and commemorative publications.28 
 
Figure 2. Professor Jack Richardson. Source: Commonwealth Ombudsman. 
 
From the moment of his appointment in March 1977, Richardson was determined that his office 
would be “accessible to citizens all about Australia and not centred merely in Canberra”,29 
subsequently revising this ambition to “the principal areas of population in each State.”30 Previous 
commentators have noted Richardson’s strategies for responding to the mammoth service delivery 
challenge that greeted him and his five staff upon opening the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s doors 
on 1 July 1977: initiating investigations on the basis of both written and oral complaints,31 making 
extensive use of the telephone to both record and investigate complaints, establishing state office 
branches throughout the nation to improve access to the ombudsman’s services, and bringing 
systemic administration problems to the attention of government agencies—thereby reducing the 
root causes of similar complaints.32 Unfortunately, with the exception of Richardson’s insights as a 
participant, the literature does not engage with the politics of establishing joint ombudsman offices 
in Australia and the factors that both aided and delayed their creation. It is here that this article is 
focused. A brief explanation of Richardson’s appointment follows, noting the wider global demand 
for ombudsmen at this time.  
 
Discovering the ombudsman 
 
With their modern origins located in nineteenth-century Sweden,33 present-day ombudsmen 
scrutinise a variety of actions undertaken by administrators in both the public and private sector. 
Proliferation of the institution in this latter domain has been driven by the privatisation of public 
services and a push for self-regulation by industry since the 1980s.34 Enjoying global success after 
World War II with the rise of the welfare state and the pressure for constitutional commitments to 
human rights in post-colonial/communist countries, an ombudsman’s powers and responsibilities 
vary considerably.35 In Australia, the ombudsman was but one concept to emerge from the reports 
of several committees that were formed to investigate the administrative processes of the federal 
government. These comprised the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee (the Kerr 
Committee—which argued the case for a new system of administrative law in 1971),36 the 
Committee on Administrative Discretions (the Bland Committee—issuing two reports in 1973)37 and 
the Committee of Review of Prerogative Writ Procedures (the Ellicott Committee—also released in 
1973).38 A Freedom of Information inquiry produced a report in 1974.39 Many of their 
recommendations went on to be embodied in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cwlth), 
Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cwlth), Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cwlth) and the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cwlth). As Jackie Dickenson notes, the ombudsman and 
associated reforms were designed “to narrow the distance between politicians and voters, to make 
government more accountable, to reverse the alienation from political processes felt by individual 
citizens in the face of government growth, and to reduce the erosion of public trust in Australia’s 
democratic institutions.”40 
 
As noted above, while the Commonwealth Ombudsman began operating on 1 July 1977, the 
institution was already firmly established in Western Australia (1971), South Australia (1972), 
Victoria (1973), Queensland (1974) and New South Wales (1975). Tasmania (1978), the Northern 
Territory (1981) and the Australian Capital Territory (1989) followed the trend.41 Although scorned 
as “nonsense” by Australian administrative law academics,42 many parliamentarians in the 1960s 
and early 1970s believed they already performed an ombudsman’s duties in dealing with the 
concerns of constituents and exercising their influence to resolve a citizen’s difficulties with 
bureaucracy.43 Indeed, when discussing the electorate problem-solving efforts of Edward Hanlon, 
member for the Brisbane seat of Ithaca (1926–52) and premier (1946–52),44 even a former 
Queensland ombudsman referred to Hanlon as “one of the best ombudsmen that we’ve had.”45 The 
idea of politicians serving as ombudsmen did change with time, however, as the ombudsman 
concept was ultimately greeted with much political enthusiasm.46 
 
Once support had built sufficiently within the federal government for the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, the attorney-general, Robert Ellicott, was practical in his approach to the task of 
implementation. Quick to acknowledge both geographical realities and the likely demand for a 
federal ombudsman’s services throughout Australia, Ellicott’s submission to federal cabinet in 
January 1976 stressed that “representation in the State capitals would probably be required.”47 In 
light of earlier approval for the ombudsman at the state level, Ellicott did not foresee any 
implications “for relations at any government level”48 at this point. Speculating on the future, he also 
contended “that when the Ombudsman’s staff is operating at full strength the staff, including 
investigatory and secretarial assistance, would total approximately 40 positions, spread around 
Australia. [However], in the initial stages the numbers of staff would be much smaller”.49 It seems 
clear that the Commonwealth saw some form of state representation for the Office as beneficial 
early in the decision-making process, a belief that would later guide the conversation with individual 
states about office co-location. With this aspiration in mind, in May 1976 the federal cabinet decided 
to open discussions with Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia to determine if their 
state ombudsmen would receive complaints and conduct interviews with the public on behalf of the 
future Commonwealth Ombudsman.50 During Cabinet’s deliberations, many of the powers of the 
Office were being finalised. These are considered below. 
 
Functions and responsibilities 
 
The Commonwealth Ombudsman is an independent institution that reports to Parliament, with 
powers to investigate administrative actions undertaken by federal government agencies that are 
brought to its attention via a complaint, or pursued at the ombudsman’s own motion.51 If, at the end 
of an investigation, the ombudsman concludes that the actions of a government department were 
contrary to law, unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, improperly discriminatory, or based wholly or 
partly on a mistake of fact, the ombudsman can make recommendations for a government agency to 
redress the problem.52 If the ombudsman’s recommendations are ignored (the Office does not have 
any enforcement powers), scope to issue reports to the prime minister and Parliament also exist—as 
do the implications of media coverage, political embarrassment and potential further questioning of 
agency staff.53 Use of these powers is rare, with the strength of the Office lying in its ability to 
impartially adjudicate between all parties. The range of an ombudsman’s recommendations has 
expanded in recent times, from that focused on the resolution of individual complaints received 
from the public, to the making of systemic recommendations for the improvement of government 
administrative procedures, policies or legislation more generally.54 Beyond this, the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman (and its state equivalents) has also assumed new auditing and monitoring 
responsibilities, “which have the primary goal of improving the overall quality of public 
administration”.55 The specialisations of the Commonwealth Ombudsman have also grown, as seen 
in its accumulation of titles: Defence Force Ombudsman, Immigration Ombudsman and Postal 
Industry Ombudsman.56 
 
Discretionary powers allow the ombudsman to decline to investigate a complaint if deemed to be 
frivolous, not warranted “having regard to all the circumstances”, or if the complainant does not 
have a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the complaint.57 In performing their investigations, 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman is entrusted with powers to obtain information and documents—
and to require staff from government agencies to appear before the ombudsman to answer 
questions relating to an investigation.58 Notably, the Commonwealth Ombudsman is prevented from 
investigating the actions of ministers, Cabinet and judicial officers, among other limitations.59 
Requests by an ombudsman for Parliament to increase their jurisdiction are not unheard of, as 
demonstrated by the Victorian Ombudsman’s failed push for powers to investigate the judiciary’s 
actions in the early 1990s.60 On occasion, the ombudsman has also experienced challenges to its 
authority to investigate government agencies.61 Queensland’s Ombudsman has been granted 
similarly defined functions, discretions and jurisdictional limitations—with some crucial differences, 
such as being unable to investigate the administrative actions of police and having local government 
administration included within its purview.62 Significantly, Queensland’s 2001 legislation explicitly 
widened the systemic operations of the Queensland Ombudsman to “consider the administrative 
practices and procedures of agencies generally and ... make recommendations or provide 
information or other help to the agencies for the[ir] improvement”.63 
 
The degree of jurisdictional cooperation between the Commonwealth and Queensland ombudsmen 
has also evolved over time and was another source of cooperation between Australia’s ombudsmen 
beyond the co-location of offices. While there is now capacity for joint investigations to be 
conducted by the Commonwealth and State ombudsmen, where deemed appropriate,64 this 
legislative change did not occur until 1983 and involved detailed discussion between the federal and 
state governments before passing into law.65 The issue of joint investigations was first raised by the 
acting prime minister in June 1977, who observed at the outset that any cooperation would “depend 
to a large extent on the relationships that Ombudsmen developed between themselves and the 
readiness of the Commonwealth and State governments to permit co-operative investigations.”66 
Reaching in-principle agreement on the matter, Richardson and his state counterparts took the view 
that cooperation would be forthcoming whenever the need arose, concluding “that it may be better 
for working arrangements to evolve as cases occur.”67 Following the Third Australasian Conference 
of Ombudsmen, held in Brisbane in September 1978, it was agreed that mutual arrangements 
should be designed to “create an adequate umbrella for the satisfactory investigation of a complaint 
involving both a State and the Commonwealth or two or more States.”68 By 1981, it was accepted 
that amendments to the Commonwealth’s ombudsman legislation were necessary to formalise this 
spirit of cooperation and to empower the Commonwealth Ombudsman with the authority to 
provide information to other Australian ombudsmen for the purposes of joint investigations.69 Given 
that the subject of joint investigations was explored in the same period of time as negotiations over 
office co-location, it might be argued that these jurisdictional questions assisted in fostering an 
environment that was also conducive for cooperation on office-sharing matters. 
 
With these powers, the scale and scope of an ombudsman’s investigation can vary enormously, from 
flawed evidence-collection procedures used by Queensland water pollution regulators in the late 
1980s,70 to complaints made by students against university administrators.71 In 2012–13, the 
Queensland Ombudsman held 82 training sessions for agencies (on topics such as good decision-
making), made 183 recommendations to public agencies, conducted 818 investigations, received 
15,191 contacts from the community, and finalised 6,406 complaints.72 In the same financial year, 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman received 26,474 complaints and approaches from the Australian 
public, down from 40,092 in 2011–12, a fall attributed to new telephone processes that inform 
callers of “out of jurisdiction matters” and “the preliminary steps they should take before making a 
complaint to our office.”73 A total of 8,591 complaints were assessed by investigation officers.74 By 
establishing their joint office, the Commonwealth and Queensland ombudsmen gave practical 




The issue of the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s accommodation needed to be carefully considered 
by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, not only to maintain positive relations with 
the States, but also to present an appropriate image of the Office to the public and to distinguish it 
from other components of the administrative law system. This was made clear when the foundation 
president of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Justice Gerald Brennan, suggested that the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Tribunal should share accommodation. The assistant secretary 
of the department, A.G. Kerr, was not inclined to support the proposal, as he believed that shared 
offices between the two Commonwealth bodies “could be seen to compromise the Ombudsman’s 
position of independence, in particular of independence from the processes of legal review of 
decisions.” In advice to the department’s secretary, Kerr acknowledged the potential risks and 
benefits of such a move: 
 
It is possible that there could be shared use of some common facilities eg. records storage and typing facilities 
but even here I believe that the Ombudsman’s independence could be placed at risk eg. in the matter of privacy 
of information entrusted by citizens to the Ombudsman. There is, however, a good case for the Ombudsman to 
be located in an area easily accessible to the public and close to or even in the same building as other 
Commonwealth authorities including the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Again, if you agree, we would continue 
in our talks with the Department of Administrative Services regarding accommodation to discourage suggestions 
that the Ombudsman should share his accommodation in the way suggested by Justice Brennan.75 
 
Early plans for the Commonwealth Ombudsman envisaged that it would have an office in each state, 
including the Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory, so that the public could register 
complaints and be interviewed by the ombudsman’s staff. However, when initial overtures were 
made by Acting Prime Minister Doug Anthony to Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen in August 1976, it was 
felt that the workload would be insufficient in some states and not justify a separate office at that 
time. Instead, the Commonwealth’s proposal was to request that the Queensland Ombudsman 
“receive and send to Canberra, complaints directed to the Commonwealth Ombudsman and conduct 
interviews” on behalf of the Commonwealth Ombudsman.76 Bjelke-Petersen responded a month 
later, agreeing that discussions should begin with officials from both governments on this issue.77 
The Queensland ombudsman, David Longland, was also informed of the Commonwealth’s 
approach,78 replying in turn that such an arrangement was possible—but that questions of staffing 
would need to be addressed in light of his existing workload.79 While the Commonwealth dealt with 
the States on an individual basis to secure their support, informal discussions about cooperation also 
occurred between all five then existing Australian ombudsmen at the First International 
Ombudsman Conference in Edmonton, Canada, in September 1976. Despite reservations from some 
about an administrative delegation from the Commonwealth to the States, each indicated their 
willingness to participate in any negotiations with the Commonwealth.80 
 
The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet was not the only Commonwealth agency to seek 
out cooperation with the Queensland Ombudsman. Contact was also made directly with the 
ombudsman by the federal commissioner for community relations, A.J. Grassby, in the hope of 
jointly confronting instances of racial discrimination within Queensland—including discriminatory 
acts by state government agencies. Grassby proposed to achieve this in one of two ways. First, 
Grassby suggested that he could forward complaints of racial discrimination in Queensland on to the 
Queensland Ombudsman “with any necessary authority” required from the commissioner to 
investigate complaints, “in particular those relating to the Queensland Government authorities.” 
Alternatively, the commissioner proposed advising complainants to approach the Queensland 
Ombudsman directly in the first instance. These suggestions were made in the context of the 
recently passed Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cwlth), which granted the commissioner the 
discretion not to investigate complaints if other remedies were reasonably available.81 While the 
Office of Community Relations had existed since September 1974, the Act did not enter into force 
until 31 October 1975, with the commissioner then gaining powers and responsibilities as part of 
Australia’s commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.82 Grassby’s correspondence was passed from the ombudsman to the undersecretary 
of the premier’s department, who—after seeking legal advice from the parliamentary counsel—
greeted Grassby’s proposals suspiciously: 
 
I am left with the feeling that the passing of the problem to a Queensland Authority relieves 
the Commonwealth Commissioner, in terms of actual work, of the responsibility of seeking a 
solution to a complaint. On the other hand, the cost of setting up a Regional Organisation—
to cover the whole of the State—would be substantial ... The Commonwealth Commissioner 
goes on to refer to complaints (a) of racial discrimination in Queensland; and (b) relating to 
the Queensland Government authorities. In my opinion, the Queensland Government 
should be more concerned with (b) than (a), and in all probability has a real responsibility to 
seek solutions with regard to (b) ... [I]f the Queensland “Ombudsman” were to handle 
complaints under (a), he would be acting as the agent of the Commonwealth under the 
delegation from their Commissioner, and, in effect, he would be doing the Commonwealth’s 
work for them.83 
 
Longland was advised to inform Grassby that he should refer complainants directly to the state 
ombudsman. Longland’s reply to Grassby emphasised the importance of avoiding the delicate area 
of Commonwealth/State relations, with Grassby’s first proposal appearing to impinge upon this. 
Longland encouraged Grassby to initiate a traditional prime minister/premier contact to progress 
the matter. Longland indicated that if Grassby decided not to investigate a complaint and advised a 
person to approach the Queensland ombudsman, he would “consider any complaint made”, 
provided it was within jurisdiction. He was also willing to extend the same professional courtesy to 
Grassby, informing complainants of Grassby’s role where appropriate, if Longland himself held no 
authority to investigate a matter.84 
 Grassby subsequently argued that his role as commissioner authorised him to represent 
complainants before the Queensland ombudsman. On this issue, Longland countered that: “[A] 
representative within the meaning of my Act should normally be a person who has a direct personal 
link with a complaint or a person such as a solicitor who is under an obligation of confidence to the 
complainant ... I should normally not accept complaints from a public official such as the 
Commissioner for Community Relations.”85 Grassby also contended that, as a result of the provisions 
of the Racial Discrimination Act, he became “a complainant” for the purposes of Queensland’s 
ombudsman legislation. Longland disagreed again with Grassby’s interpretation, forcing the 
commissioner to accept Longland’s point of view and to direct complainants to Longland where 
appropriate.86 Longland stressed the need for complaints to be made to his office with as little 
formality as possible, believing the acceptance of complaints from directly aggrieved persons and 
their accepted personal representatives was essential to that process. This was particularly crucial in 
light of the need for confidentiality. It was not Longland’s intention to avoid dealing with the 
complaints of Indigenous people, stating he had an obligation to respond to them “in exactly the 
same manner as any other complaint.” Longland was “happy to report that a number of complaints” 
had been referred to him by Queensland’s Indigenous community and ended in a satisfactory 
resolution, adding that “the racial origin of my complainants is irrelevant”.87 
 
Longland’s careful replies to Commissioner Grassby, along with his desire for advice from the 
premier’s department, were signs of his political awareness—as racial discrimination was a sensitive 
policy area for the Bjelke-Petersen government at this time. This was not least because of the 
premier’s quarrel with the Commonwealth and Presbyterian Church over plans for a bauxite mining 
development at Aurukun in western Cape York. Following protests from Church leaders, Longland 
formally investigated the matter in March 1976, visiting the Aurukun community to assess their 
concerns about a decision by the Queensland Department of Aboriginal and Islander Advancement 
to administer a bauxite royalty fund on the Aurukun community’s behalf. This arrangement was 
designed to benefit the state’s Indigenous population as a whole and would be maintained by a 
meagre 3% of new royalties obtained at the Aurukun site, as part of an agreement with the bauxite 
project developer, Aurukun Associates. Longland’s critical report to the Queensland Parliament 
recommended additional consultation between the community, the state government and Aurukun 
Associates, with renegotiation of the bauxite agreement also being suggested if necessary.88 
Comments from the Commonwealth on this matter would not be tolerated by Bjelke-Petersen 
without counterattack in the media.89 Longland’s views, however, were seemingly accepted by the 
premier. Advice from Queensland’s parliamentary counsel about Grassby’s proposals proved 
accurate on this point: “if an investigation is to be made into an action of a Queensland Government 
department, accompanied perhaps by some criticism, it would be better that the criticism should 
come from the Queensland Parliamentary Commissioner than from a Commonwealth authority.”90 
Grassby’s approaches to Longland were certainly noticed by Bjelke-Petersen. Under his instruction, 
Cabinet initially declared that “no information of any kind” was “to be supplied to the Commissioner 
for Community Relations”–with Longland and the Director of the Department of Aboriginal and 
Islander Advancement informed of this.91 This decision was later reversed, with Grassby’s own 
report into complaints of racial discrimination in Queensland between October 1975 and August 
1981 highlighting several instances in which communication between him and the Queensland 
ombudsman facilitated the resolution of complaints from Indigenous people.92 It was against this 
background that Commonwealth representatives were sent to Brisbane to explore ombudsman 
office-sharing options. 
 
“They won’t believe it!” 
 
Officials from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet visited Brisbane on 17 January 1977 
to meet with officers of the Queensland premier’s department and a soon-to-be knighted David 
Longland.93 With an eye to the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s impending appointment, the 
intention was to have initial discussions of a non-committal nature—as it was felt that an “interim 
arrangement” was needed prior to the Commonwealth Ombudsman pursuing any further 
modifications with their state counterparts.94 Longland foresaw a larger role for the Queensland 
Ombudsman than simply “that of a postbox for forwarding complaints to the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman.” He favoured a delegated authority from the Commonwealth to receive complaints, 
interview complainants as required and “pursue the investigation”, on the proviso that the 
Commonwealth funded an additional investigating officer for his office. Ultimately agreeing to put 
financial and staffing matters aside until the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s appointment, the 
parties accepted that existing ad hoc arrangements for dealing with federal complaints from 
Queensland residents would continue for the moment—namely Longland’s practice of referring 
complaints to the heads of Commonwealth agencies in Brisbane and advising the complainant of 
this.95 In agreeing to cooperate with the Commonwealth, Longland realised that any future “growth 
in work performance need” could force the Commonwealth Ombudsman to create its own branch 
office in Brisbane and appoint a deputy ombudsman for Queensland.96 Interestingly, the 
Commonwealth’s negotiations with other states yielded a range of alternatives “from the States 
undertaking the complete investigation of Commonwealth queries to the need for a separate 
representative of the Commonwealth Ombudsman to be located in the State concerned.”97 
 
In the next stage of negotiations, professional relationships were crucial. An ombudsman’s personal 
style and personality is widely recognised as exerting a powerful influence on the approaches taken 
by the institution throughout its history.98 Further, in a recent study of Australian intergovernmental 
relations, Jennifer Menzies quotes Canadian scholarship to argue that “‘personality matters’ and 
remains one of the greatest intangibles in executive decision-making”—as both a constructive and 
destructive force.99 When Professor Jack Richardson took up the position of Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, future cooperation with ombudsmen in Queensland hinged largely on the relationship 
between him, Longland and Bjelke-Petersen. In attempting to establish offices in the mainland 
capitals, Richardson was encouraged by his experience with Western Australia: “I had the good 
fortune to know Premier [Charles] Court reasonably well and [the State Ombudsman] Oliver Dixon ... 
[They] proved very cooperative.”100 
 
In Queensland, Richardson was aware that some saw his prospects of securing agreement with the 
premier as non-existent: “[E]verybody said, ‘With Joh Bjelke-Petersen up there and his attitude to 
Commonwealth things you have got Buckley’s chance of success.’ But I knew David Longland ... I 
knew that he was a favourite son in effect of the Premier ... [and] Longland and I got on pretty 
well.”101 Longland had worked from 1957–68 as undersecretary of the Queensland Department of 
Public Works and Housing.102 By “favourite son”, Richardson alluded to the contact Longland had 
with Bjelke-Petersen in this department: the future premier (1968–87) accepting this portfolio for 
his first ministerial appointment, in September 1963.103 Longland also gave Bjelke-Petersen 
steadying advice at this critical time in his career.104 This shared history may also have influenced the 
premier in becoming a convert to the ombudsman idea, particularly after observing Longland as 
Queensland’s ombudsman from the opening of the office on 8 October 1974.105 
 
Richardson reached in-principle agreement with Longland on shared office accommodation during 
informal discussions in early 1978, asking the acting prime minister, Doug Anthony, to send a letter 
in support of the idea to Bjelke-Petersen.106 Bjelke-Petersen concurred that formal discussions 
should be entered into by Longland and Richardson to advance the proposal.107 Richardson met with 
Longland again in Brisbane at the Third Australasian Conference of Ombudsmen.108 At the 
conference, they “had a discussion about getting this office together and we lunched with the 
Premier and ... the Premier agreed. He said, ‘That’s a great idea’ ... He was quite enthusiastic ... He 
said, ‘I’ve got to take it up with my Cabinet, they won’t believe it!’”109 Cabinet was indeed surprised. 
Bjelke-Petersen’s control over Cabinet’s decision-making is well documented; members were often 
eager to “rubber stamp”110 the premier’s proposals rather than risk confrontation.111 On this 
occasion, however, Cabinet rejected Bjelke-Petersen’s submission and demanded more 
information.112 Richardson recalled: 
 
[Cabinet were concerned that] once the Commonwealth moved in, there wouldn’t be some 
kind of a takeover operation, so that the Commonwealth sort of predominated in this 
ombudsman office. Of course, there was no way that was possible. I mean, this was a branch 
office as far as we were concerned. So we explained all that. We were very much the minor 
partner.113 
 
In response to Cabinet, Bjelke-Petersen cited Western Australia’s successful experience with its joint 
office, underscoring the advantages of reduced costs and decreased public frustration. He reassured 
his Cabinet colleagues that “the jurisdictions of the State and Commonwealth Ombudsmen are 
mutually exclusive; each Office retains its own distinct identity, function and responsibility as 
required by Statute”.114 It was not the first time that Queensland had drawn on Western Australia’s 
ombudsman experience to answer questions of its own, with the undersecretary of the premier’s 
department, Keith Spann, and parliamentary draftsman, J.P. O’Callaghan, both being sent to Perth in 
late 1972 to learn more about Western Australia’s ombudsman legislation so that Queensland might 
better understand the concept for itself.115 Cabinet may have been conscious of this past contact 
and advice, therefore being more receptive to Bjelke-Petersen’s contention that Western Australia’s 
success with its joint office could be replicated in the Sunshine State. In any case, Cabinet approved 
his request to inform the prime minister that Queensland was agreeable to a joint State and 
Commonwealth Ombudsman office in Brisbane.116 This arrangement was within the terms of a 
Heads of Agreement document jointly drafted by Richardson and Longland. The agreement specified 
staffing, rental and establishment costs.117 With this accepted, David Robson, a former solicitor and 
lieutenant colonel, was appointed as Queensland’s Assistant Commonwealth Ombudsman on 26 
February 1979.118 Prior to the office opening, Longland explained the shared accommodation plans: 
 
[T]here will be a common reception area in the shared office where all complaints may be 
received. An experienced receptionist will then advise the person as to the appropriate 
office, Commonwealth or State, for their complaint and the matter will then proceed in the 
usual way ... I predict that the environment of the shared office will be favourable and that 
its establishment will be justified by the results obtained.119 
 
Longland retired from his Ombudsman post on 31 May, 1979,120 but his hopes for the joint office 
were confirmed. Longland’s successor, Sir David Muir (see Figure 3),121 held the Queensland 
Ombudsman role from 1 June 1979 to 30 July 1981.122 Like his predecessor,123 Muir was a career 
public servant124 and had in fact been a student of Longland’s at Brisbane Commercial High School in 
the early 1930s.125 The Commonwealth-State agreement altered during Muir’s time at the helm, 
with the ceasing of “impracticable” joint visits to regional areas of Queensland.126 Complaints from 
regional residents were still passed on to the relevant jurisdiction after an individual ombudsman 
visit, however.127 Richardson criticised this shift in 1995, viewing Muir as an unenthusiastic supporter 
of the shared enterprise and believing the office lost an edge when visiting regional centres as a 
result, but conceding that “it’s probably working fairly satisfactorily now.”128 A review of the 
agreement in 1981 led to further changes, with the Assistant Commonwealth Ombudsman and staff 
moving to an office adjoining the Queensland Ombudsman—their common reception for 
complainants and joint telephone number retained.129 Nonetheless, the sharing of office facilities 
was beneficial in ways beyond the already stated public convenience and cost efficiencies, whether 
“in the opportunity provided to discuss ... ‘grey’ area cases with my Commonwealth counterpart”,130 
or “occasions when the staff of one office seeks assistance from staff in the other.”131 Outside of 
these operational practicalities, “the staff enjoy a most cordial and friendly relationship.”132 
 
Figure 3. Sir David Muir. Source: Queensland Ombudsman. 
 
Conclusion 
 Investigating how professional relationships impacted on the development of the “New 
Administrative Law” is one way of understanding Australia’s rapid and “remarkable” acceptance of 
profound changes to the principles and institutions of public administration in the 1970s and 
1980s.133 This article has shown how strong working relationships between ombudsmen, politicians 
and public servants could—when sympathetically attuned—overcome multiple sources of concern 
to establish a joint ombudsman office in Queensland, a situation that seemed completely untenable 
to observers in both Canberra and Brisbane. The legacy of that cooperation is a service delivery 
convenience for the people of Queensland that has endured for more than thirty years. By revealing 
one part of the service delivery challenge of these reforms, this article widens political analysis of 
this crucial period in national law reform, casting light on the politics of newly formed accountability 
agencies and their relationships with each other—as seen with the Office of the Commissioner for 
Community Relations and the Queensland Ombudsman. Joint ombudsman investigations and the 
question of co-locating the Commonwealth Ombudsman with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
also showcase the importance placed on cooperation among the ombudsmen and the significance of 
generating an appropriate public perception of these new independent organisations. It also 
demonstrates that Bjelke-Petersen could alter his position on matters of federalism and public 
accountability, if convinced by the experience of another Australian jurisdiction. Other factors that 
supported the co-location of offices were also canvassed, with the Commonwealth’s early strategic 
intention to establish ombudsman offices nationwide. This goal was carried through to 
implementation by Professor Richardson’s astute negotiation skills, using pre-existing relationships 
between premiers and state ombudsmen to achieve mutually agreeable outcomes. Whatever the 
future holds for the Albert Street office and Australian complaint-handling agencies more generally, 
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